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PETITIONING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS:
THE ACT OF STATE AND NOERR-
PENNINGTON DOCTRINES
Don R. Sampen*
With growing application of the antitrust laws to conduct
abroad,' commentators and practitioners have increasingly focused
their attention on the act of state and Noerr-Pennington doctrines
as defenses for persons seeking anticompetitive acts of foreign gov-
ernments.2 The two doctrines have grown separately in the law,
each with its own historical justification, limitations, and excep-
tions. The act of state doctrine was developed to protect primarily
the interests of the United States government and, secondarily, the
interests of foreign governments. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine
was designed to preserve the rights of persons seeking government
anticompetitive acts. The former focuses on acts of government;
the latter focuses on acts of private persons.
Despite their separate development, the two doctrines overlap in
* Partner, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., Northwestern University (1972); J.D.,
Northwestern University (1975); member of the Illinois bar.
See generally Norton, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of U.S. Antitrust and Securities
Laws, 28 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 575 (1979); Kintner and Griffin, Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Commerce Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 199 (1977);
Beausang, The Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, 70 DICK. L. REv. 187
(1966).
These two doctrines do not provide the only defenses for persons petitioning foreign
governments. Also relevant are the "balancing of considerations" rules applicable to juris-
diction and comity. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98
(3rd Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977)
(vacating and remanding dismissals by Judge Burke of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (dismissing
complaints for lack of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens), afl'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1984). See also S. 397, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), which would codify the "jurisdictional
rule of reason" and grant U.S. courts power to limit recovery to actual damages in the inter-
est of international relations. The present article assumes the existence of jurisdiction over
the defendant and further assumes that comity considerations would not prevent the exer-
cise of jurisdiction. The defense of foreign compulsion may also be relevant. See Interna-
tional Refinery Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 419 (Revised)
(Tent. Draft No. 3 1982).
' See B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MASKEr AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A CoM-
PARATIVE GUIDE 148 (1982) [hereinafter cited as HAWK].
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significant areas. This overlap presents the issue of how great the
nexus between the two doctrines should be. If, for example, the
government act being sought is found not to be an act of state,
should the defendant's petitioning activity nevertheless find pro-
tection under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine? Conversely, if No-
err-Pennington is inapplicable, should the defendant be allowed to
invoke the act of state doctrine?
This article addresses the relationship between the act of state
and Noerr-Pennington doctrines. In doing so, it reviews the bases
for the doctrines and investigates the most troublesome areas of
their application in the international context. The article also dis-
cusses the relative strengths and weaknesses of the doctrines as de-
fenses to petitioning activity directed at foreign governments and
considers areas where clarification of the law may be necessary.
I. ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
While the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was developed primarily
within the last generation, the act of state doctrine is as old as the
republic itself.L4 The classic statement of the doctrine appears in
Underhill v. Hernandez,5 in which the Supreme Court held:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.6
The doctrine, in effect, prohibits United States courts from ad-
judging the validity of acts of foreign governments committed
within their territory. The three most recent important Supreme
Court cases on the doctrine arose in the context of confiscation by
a foreign state of private property within its borders.7 In the first
' See The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822); L'Invincible, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 238 (1816); The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812);
Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293 (1808). The doctrine has its roots in seventeenth
and eighteenth century perceptions of national sovereignty. See Riley, The Act of State
Doctrine: Antitrust Conspiracies to Induce Foreign Sovereign Acts, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 495, 496-97 (1978).
5 168 U.S. 250 (1897). See also Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918).
' Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See generally Bishop, Outline of the Act of State Doctrine and
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of these, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,8 an agency of the
Cuban government brought suit in the United States to recover the
proceeds from the sale of sugar that had been seized by the Cuban
government prior to its sale from the seller's assignee. The lower
court dismissed the case on the ground that the Cuban expropria-
tion violated international law and was therefore invalid." The Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the act of state doctrine barred
consideration of the validity of public acts committed by a recog-
nized foreign sovereign power within its territory.10 The Court ob-
served that application of the doctrine is not compelled by the
United States Constitution or international law,1 and that the
doctrine does not even apply when international law has been vio-
lated. 1 2 The doctrine does, however, have "'constitutional' under-
pinnings" because it "arises out of the basic relationships between
branches of government in a system of separation of powers.""
The Court explained that the doctrine expresses the concern of the
judicial branch "that its engagement in the task of passing on the
validity of foreign acts of state may hinder" the conduct of foreign
policy. 14 The majority rejected the argument that the doctrine
should not apply unless the executive branch specifically inter-
poses it in a particular case, but expressly left open the question of
whether the executive branch could direct that the doctrine not
apply."5
The year after Sabbatino was decided, Congress passed the
"Hickenlooper Amendment"1 6 in an attempt to overrule the hold-
ing in Sabbatino that the act of state doctrine may bar adjudica-
tion of violations of international law. By its terms, this legislation
makes the doctrine inapplicable to cases based upon such viola-
tions. The courts, however, have limited the effect of the Hick-
its Exceptions, 1 INT'L LITIG. Q. 71 (June 1985).
8 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
' Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
10 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-37.
" Id. at 421-23.
" Id. at 430-31.
3 Id. at 423.
14 Id.
" In so stating the Court shifted awayfrom the doctrine's earlier use to prevent embar-
rassment to the executive branch. Zimmerman, Applying an Amorphous Doctrine Wisely:
The Viability of the Act of State Doctrine After the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 18
TEX. INT'L L. J. 547, 555 (1983).
"' Pub. L. No. 89-171, 79 Stat. 653 (1965), so called because it was an amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1965. It is presently codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976).
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enlooper Amendment to situations where the confiscated property
is located in the United States or where it is located outside the
United States and an attempt is made to market it here. 7
In First Na.tional City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,8 a
plurality of three justices' 9 answered in the affirmative the ques-
tion left open in Sabbatino. A Cuban banking agency brought the
suit seeking the amount in excess of principal and unpaid interest
realized by a New York bank on the sale of collateral used to se-
cure a loan to the Cuban government. By way of setoff and coun-
terclaim, the New York bank sought damages for the expropriation
of its property in Cuba. The district court granted the bank's mo-
tion for summary judgment,20 but the court of appeals reversed.21
During the initial pendency of the case before the Supreme Court,
the State Department submitted a letter stating that the act of
state doctrine should not be applied to bar consideration of the
bank's counterclaim. The Court thereupon remanded the case to
the Second Circuit to allow it to reconsider its earlier opinion in
light of the letter.2 The Second Circuit nevertheless dismissed the
counterclaim on the authority of Sabbatino.2 ' The Supreme Court
reversed."
The Court's plurality opinion observed that the doctrine "pre-
cludes any review whatever of the acts of the government of one
sovereign state done within its own territory by the courts of an-
other sovereign state." The plurality noted, however, that the doc-
17 Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983); Empress Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y sus
Derivados v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1981).
lB 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
The plurality consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and White. Jus-
tice Douglas concurred in the result on the basis of National City Bank v. Republic of
China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), in which the Court reversed the dismissal of a counterclaim
against the Republic of China on the ground that a foreign government should not be al-
lowed to take advantage of the court system without incurring the risks that may result, and
on the further ground that the State Department had not requested immunity for the for-
eign government. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment on the ground that federal
courts have an obligation to hear these kinds of cases unless it is shown that the exercise of
jurisdiction would interfere with the conduct of foreign policy.
10 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York, 270 F. Supp. 1004
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
21 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York, 431 F.2d 394 (2d
Cir. 1970).
" See First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 400 U.S. 1019 (1971).
" Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York, 442 F.2d 530 (2d
Cir. 1971).
1, First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional De Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
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trine "is not an inflexible one" and that it represents an exception
to the general rule that United States courts will decide the cases
before them. 28 The plurality further noted that "[t]he act of state
doctrine, like the doctrine of immunity for foreign sovereigns, has
its roots not in the Constitution, but in the notion of comity be-
tween independent sovereigns." The doctrine is "buttressed by ju-
dicial deference to the exclusive power of the Executive over the
conduct of relations" with foreign powers, and is justified "on the
basis that juridical review of acts of state of a foreign power could
embarrass the conduct of foreign relations. ' 26 Given these consid-
erations, the plurality held that when the executive branch "ex-
pressly represents to the Court that application of the act of state
doctrine would not advance the interests of American foreign pol-
icy, that doctrine should not be applied by the courts. '2 7 In so
holding, the plurality adopted the so-called Bernstein exception to
the act of state doctrine.28
In the third case, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 29 another plurality of the Court recognized a second excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine. In Dunhill, the former owners of
Cuban cigar manufacturing concerns sought recovery against three
American cigar importers for money owing both before and after
the Cuban government designated "interventors" to confiscate and
run the concerns. The importers had paid the sums owing prior to
"intervention" to the Cuban government. The lower courts ruled
that the former owners were entitled to recover those amounts,
while the government interventors were entitled to recover the
post-intervention sums. The courts further held that the importers
25 Id. at 763.
20 Id. at 765.
27 Id. at 768.
28 Under the Bernstein exception the executive branch can relieve the judicial branch of
the act of state doctrine's restraint upon the exercise of jurisdiction. The Bernstein excep-
tion arose out of Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe
Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947), a suit
growing out of Nazi Germany's confiscation of Jewish property. Judge Hand found nothing
in that case to indicate that the executive branch had acted in the manner necessary to
remove application of the doctrine. In a subsequent case, however, the same court amended
its mandate to permit the introduction of evidence concerning acts of officials in Germany
during the Nazi period, following receipt by plaintiff's attorney of a State Department letter
declaring the executive branch's policy to relieve the courts from any restraint on their ju-
risdiction in passing on the validity of acts of Nazi officials. Bernstein v. N.V. Neder-
landsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). For a dis-
cussion of other possible exceptions, see Bishop, supra note 7, at 76-83.
29 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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were entitled to offset the amounts they had already paid for the
pre-intervention period against the post-intervention claims of the
interventors. The issue on appeal was whether one of the import-
ers, Dunhill, was entitled to recover an affirmative amount from
the interventors since the amount it had already paid exceeded the
amount it owed for the post-intervention period. The Second Cir-
cuit held that affirmative judgment was barred by the act of state
doctrine.30
The Supreme Court reversed, finding no evidence in the record
that the interventors possessed governmental, as opposed to com-
mercial, authority. No government order or decree had been of-
fered to show "that Cuba had repudiated its obligations" or "that
it had as a sovereign matter determined to confiscate the amounts
due" the importers.31 Thus, there was no occasion for application
of the act of state doctrine.
A plurality of four justices32 went on to hold that the concept of
an act of state should not be extended to include the repudiation
of a purely commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or
by one of its commercial instrumentalities. 3 The plurality drew
upon domestic cases recognizing that, when a state enters the mar-
ketplace, it divests itself of its sovereignty and takes on the charac-
teristics of a trader.3 4 The same reasoning, noted the plurality, pro-
vided the basis for the State Department's adoption of a
"restrictive view" of sovereign immunity. Under this view, com-
mercial activities of foreign governments, such as repudiation of
commercial debts, were stripped of their sovereign immunity."
The plurality recognized that avoiding embarrassment to the Exec-
utive in the conduct of foreign relations is "the major underpin-
ning" of the act of state doctrine, but based upon the views pres-
ently expressed by the Executive, "the purely commercial conduct
of foreign governments" need not be recognized as acts of state in
order to avoid embarrassing conflicts.36
These three cases provide the analytical background of the act of
state doctrine. As further discussed below, the doctrine typically is
brought into play in the antitrust context where an action against
" Menedez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973).
" 425 U.S. at 695.
" Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.
3 425 U.S. at 696.
4Id.
" Id. at 698-99.
" Id. at 697-98.
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a private party is predicated on a claim that a foreign government,
upon the petition of the private party, acted wrongfully. In this
context, the act of state doctrine was the only theory, at least until
1981, apart from jurisdictional and comity defenses, allowed by the
courts as a petitioning defense at the international level.3 7
II. THE Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
Unlike the act of state doctrine, which developed in an interna-
tional setting, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has its roots in con-
duct at the domestic level.
A. Basic Tenets
The basic tenets of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine were set
forth in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc." Plaintiffs were a group of truck operators and their
trade association which brought suit against a group of railroads,
an association of the presidents of the railroads, and a public rela-
tions firm for conspiring to restrain trade in and monopolize the
long distance freight business. The defendants allegedly carried
out the conspiracy through a publicity campaign designed to foster
the adoption of laws detrimental to the trucking business and to
engender distaste for the truckers among the general public. The
campaign was alleged to have been corrupt and fraudulent because
the defendants' only motive was to destroy the truckers as compet-
itors, and because the publicity was made to appear as if it ex-
pressed the view of the public when in fact the defendants were
behind it. The plaintiffs charged that the defendants also influ-
enced legislation and caused the defeat of at least one legislative
proposal that would have favored the truckers. The defendants' re-
sponse to the complaint included a counterclaim alleging that the
truckers had engaged in similar acts against the railroads. After a
trial on the merits, the district court entered judgment for the
truckers and against the railroads on both the complaint and coun-
terclaim, finding that the railroads had used fraudulent and deceit-
ful tactics for the purpose of destroying the truckers. The court
further found that the truckers' activities were purely defensive
and without any fraudulent purpose. It awarded only nominal
damages to the individual truckers, holding that no damages were
3" See infra note 67.
- 365 U.S. 127 (1961), reh'g denied mern., 365 U.S. 875 (1961).
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recoverable for loss of business due to the defeat of the legislation,
but allowed substantial damages in favor of the truckers' associa-
tion, as well as injunctive relief.39 The court of appeals affirmed.4 °
In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court assumed
that no violation of the Sherman Act could "be predicated upon
mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws."'41
The Court found it "equally clear" that the Sherman Act could
"not prohibit two or more persons from associating together in an
attempt to persuade the legislature or the Executive to take partic-
ular action, '42 even though that action might result in a restraint
or monopoly. A holding to the contrary would not only impair the
power of government to take desired action but would also inter-
fere with the whole concept of representative democracy, through
which people may freely inform government of their wishes. Such a
ruling would also raise constitutional questions relating to the right
of petition, the Court said.43 The right of petition, moreover, could
not be made to depend upon the petitioners' self interest, so that
the railroads' anticompetitive interests did not affect the legality of
their conduct.4 4 Nor could the use of deceitful publicity constitute
a Sherman Act violation, for the Act only condemns trade re-
straints and does not establish a code of ethics for the political
arena.4" The Court also noted the district court's finding that the
defendants sought not merely to influence legislation but also to
destroy the truckers' goodwill. While indicating that the effect of
such conduct would be to render the first amendment principles
discussed above inapplicable, the Court decided that this finding
was not supported by the evidence." Finally, while acknowledging
that "a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor" would be subject to antitrust prosecution, the Court
found that no such sham had occurred. 47
The principles of Noerr were extended to attempts to influence
" Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf., 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa.
1957).
' Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf., 273 F.2d 218 (3rd Cir.
1959).
" 365 U.S. 127 at 135.
" Id. at 136.
" Id. at 137-38.
" Id. at 138-39.
I6 ld. at 140-41.
Id. at 142.
" Id. at 144.
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executive action in United Mine Workers v. Pennington."8 This
case involved a counterclaim brought by the owners of a coal com-
pany against a union and its welfare and retirement fund trustees,
alleging that the counterdefendants had engaged in various an-
ticompetitive activities to drive smaller coal companies out of busi-
ness and to increase the wages of their members. These activities
included inducing the Secretary of Labor to establish a high mini-
mum wage for employees of contractors selling coal to the TVA,
urging the TVA to curtail its spot market purchases, and engaging
in a destructive price-cutting campaign through two companies
controlled by the union. After a jury trial, the trial court entered
judgment against the union, and the court of appeals affirmed.4 9
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court for failing to take
proper account of Noerr.50 It held that "[j]oint efforts to influence
public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though in-
tended to eliminate competition," and that the trial court's jury
instruction which permitted the jury to find an anticompetitive
purpose in the counterdefendants' approach to the Secretary of
Labor was therefore erroneous.51 The Court also held that the trial
court erred in not instructing the jury that the counterplaintiffs
could not recover any damages they may have suffered as the re-
sult of the Secretary of Labor's minimum wage determinations.5"
In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,53 the
third important Supreme Court case in this area, the Court made
it clear that Noerr immunity extends beyond efforts to influence
the legislative and executive branches of government. The Court
also expanded on the "sham exception" doctrine recognized in No-
err. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants conspired to monopolize the
highway common carriage business by opposing all pending appli-
cations by competitors for operating rights. The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to
state a claim,5 4 and the Supreme Court affirmed. 56 The Court ob-
served that the same philosphy applicable to the legislative and
executive branches "governs the approach of citizens or groups of
'8 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
" Pennington v. United Mine Workers of America, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963).
60 Pennington, 381 U.S. at 659-72.
6' Id. at 670.
62 Id. at 671-72.
63 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport, 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970).
61 Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 509-16.
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them to administrative agencies . .. and to courts."56 It noted,
however, that the present complaint alleged that the defendants
sought to destroy competition by instituting proceedings without
probable cause and without regard to the merits, thereby depleting
the value of the plaintiffs' business and barring them "from mean-
ingful access to adjudicatory tribunals. 57
The Court then listed several types of "unethical conduct" that
"often result" in sanctions. These included perjury of witnesses,
use of a patent obtained by fraud, conspiring with a licensing au-
thority to eliminate a competitor, and bribing of a public purchas-
ing agent.58 The Court then noted that "[m]isrepresentations, con-
doned in the political arena, are not immunized when used in the
adjudicatory process."" Although one baseless claim may go unno-
ticed, "a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims" may give rise to a
conclusion that the administrative and judicial processes have been
abused.60 In the context of administrative and judicial processes,
these kinds of actions cannot be considered mere political expres-
sion.61 Even first amendment rights, according to the Court, are
not immune from regulation when used to violate a valid statute.6 2
B. Applicability Abroad
These three cases outline the basic parameters of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine as it applies within the United States.
Whether the doctrine applies to the petitioning of foreign govern-
ments has yet to be finally resolved. Although the Supreme Court
has not squarely ruled on the issue, it implied in Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. 3 that the doctrine may ap-
ply abroad. That case involved allegations that the defendants
completely eliminated the plaintiff from the Canadian vanadium
market through control of a subsidiary appointed by the Canadian
government as the exclusive wartime agent for the purchase and
allocation of vanadium for Canada. The Court held that these facts
would entitle the plaintiff to relief, stating that there was no evi-
dence indicating that the Canadian government would have ap-
" Id. at 510.
"7 Id. at 512.
8 Id. at 512-13.
" Id. at 513.
" Id.
a' Id.
62 Id. at 514.
63 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
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proved of a policy geared toward excluding the plaintiff from the
market." During the course of its opinion, the Court found the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine inapplicable because the defendants
"were engaged in private commercial activity, no element of which
involved seeking to procure the passage or enforcement of laws.""
The Court's failure in Continental Ore to distinguish Noerr on
the ground that a foreign government was involved provides signif-
icant support for the view that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
does apply to the petitioning of foreign governments. In addition,
the Department of Justice has argued that the doctrine applies
abroad,66 and at least two lower courts appear to have accepted
this position.6 7 The commentators also lean in favor of applica-
tion.68 This article, therefore, proceeds on the assumption that the
" Id. at 706.
" Id. at 707.
60 ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPER-
ATIONS, 62-63 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE].
67 Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1364-73 (5th Cir. 1983); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1155-57 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
supp. op. 513 F. Supp. 1334, aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. on other grounds In
re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983). In four cases, the
courts expressly declined to rule on the issue. Associated Container Transportation (Austra-
lia), Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 60 n.10 (2d Cir. 1983); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 886, 892 n.6 (5th Cir. 1982); Bulkferts, Inc. v. Salatin, Inc., 574 F.
Supp. 6, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F.
Supp. 680, 690 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Only one case has squarely held that the doctrine does
not apply abroad. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107-
08 (C.D. Cal. 1971), afld, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
The court in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 604 F. Supp. 280, 287
n.20 (D.D.C. 1984), expressed doubt about the doctrine's applications abroad. The court's
actual holding was that, because of comity considerations, foreign corporations should not
be restrained from petitioning foreign legislatures, as distinguished from foreign courts, for
the purpose of inducing them to promulgate jurisdiction-ousting laws-a proposition not
inconsistent with the recognition of a Noerr-Pennington right to induce substantive foreign
government action. In Australia/Eastern U.S.A. Shipping Conference v. United States, 537
F. Supp. 807, 812-13 (D.D.C. 1982), the court held that the Justice Department could not be
forced to apply the doctrine abroad on contitutional grounds.
The following have argued that the doctrine does or should apply abroad: 1 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW T 239(b) (1977 & AREEDA Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
AREEDA & TURNER]; HAWK, supra note 3, at 147-48; Fugate, The Department of Justice's
Antitrust Guide for International Operations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 645, 693 (1977); Rahl,
American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is Covered?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 1, 10-
11 (1974); Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United States
Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 131-32 (1967) (stating that Noerr implies that protec-
tion extends to foreign government action); Davis, Solicitation of Anticompetitive Actions
from Foreign Governments: Should the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Apply To Communica-
tions With Foreign Sovereigns?, 11 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 395, 399 (1981); Comment,
Noerr Petitioning Immunity Extended to Attempts to Influence Foreign Governments:
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doctrine applies to the petitioning of foreign governments.
III. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINES
The most pressing questions involving application of the act of
state and Noerr-Pennington doctrines abroad are concentrated in
four broad subject categories. The first question is whether a court
may consider the causal relationship between the anticompetitive
act of a foreign government and the conduct of the defendant. This
"motivation" question has been confined to litigation over the act
of state defense, but it has implications for Noerr-Pennington as
well. The second category addresses the nature and scope of the
commercial activity exception to the petitioning defenses. The
third category involves the application of the doctrines to various
branches of foreign government. The fourth relates to the sham
exception principle.
A. Motivation
So long as act of state analysis is confined strictly to the validity
of the acts of a foreign government, its role as a defense to anti-
trust claims resulting from petitioning activity is limited. Certainly
an antitrust plaintiff may challenge a defendant's petitioning activ-
ity without questioning the validity of the foreign government's re-
action. 9 For the plaintiff to prove damages, however, it must
demonstrate that the defendant's conduct had an anticompetitive
effect, i.e., that the foreign government reacted in the manner
sought by the defendant and did so because of the defendant's
conduct. Although the motivation for the foreign government's ac-
tion is not strictly a question of validity, it has nevertheless been
Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 128, 138-39 (1983); Note, The
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and the Petitioning of Foreign Governments, 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 1343 (1984) (but would make an exception for the petitioning of foreign courts).
The following have argued to the contrary: I W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE
ANTITRUST LAWS § 2.28 155-56 (1982); McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments
Abroad: An Antitrust Approach, 86 YALE L.J. 215, 240-41 (1976); Fischel, Antitrust Liabil-
ity for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the "Noerr-
Pennington" Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80, 120-21 (1977). The following commentator
appears undecided: Campbell, Corporate Lobbyists Abroad: The Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1254, 1277-81 (1973).
'9 See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
984 (1977); Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 910 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
("claims ... are viewed as avoiding allegations of direct wrongdoings by the foreign sover-
eigns themselves").
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held to be an inquiry forbidden by the act of state doctrine.7 0
1. Cases Pro and Con
The Supreme Court first suggested that United States courts
could not inquire into the motivation for a foreign government's
action in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,7 ' the first an-
titrust case to consider the act of state doctrine. Here the Court
upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint alleging that the
defendants induced Costa Rican soldiers to seize the plaintiff's
farm and railroad in Panama in order to thwart the plaintiff's
plans to ship bananas from Panama. In an opinion written by Jus-
tice Holmes, the Court decided that persuading a sovereign power
to undertake certain action cannot be a tort since the sovereign,
being maker of the law, cannot commit an unlawful act.7 2
More recently, and somewhat more directly, the Second Circuit
addressed the motivation question in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.73 In
Hunt, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants, seven major oil
producers, conspired to preserve their competitive advantage in
the international oil market by precluding the plaintiffs from
reaching any settlement with the demands of a Libyan dictator
and by otherwise manipulating the plaintiffs' dealings with Libya.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' conduct caused their
operations eventually to be nationalized by Libya, and that they
suffered substantial lost profits as a result. Finding that the suc-
cess of the plaintiffs' case necessarily depended upon establishing a
causal link between the defendants' conduct and the action taken
by Libya, the court dismissed the claim based on the act of state
doctrine.7 4 It found that the plaintiffs had "meticulously at-
tempted to avoid the issue of validity ' 75 but that their claim was
"not viable unless the judicial branch examines the motivation of
the Libyan action and that inevitably involves its validity. 76 The
court further found that the State Department had already deter-
mined that the reason for Libya's action was "political reprisal
against the United States and economic coercion against other
'0 See infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
7 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
71 Id. at 358. The Court's holding with respect to jurisdiction, which has since been repu-
diated, is discussed in note 85, infra.
7. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
71 Id. at 72-79.
78 Id. at 77.
76 Id.
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United States nationals in Libya,"77 and that this official charac-
terization should not be adjudicated further. The court held that
further adjudication would require the judiciary to inquire into the
"Serbonian bog""8 of a foreign sovereign's policy, something not
contemplated by the separation of powers principle.
The Ninth Circuit relied upon Hunt in Clayco Petroleum Corp.
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.79 Here the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant paid bribes to the petroleum minister of Umm Al
Qaywayn for the purpose of obtaining a valuable offshore oil con-
cession in that country and preventing the plaintiffs from receiving
the concession. The facts thus raised an issue expressly left unde-
cided in Hunt, namely, the application of the Hunt approach to
bribery.80 In a per curiam opinion, the Ninth Circuit noted that
the plaintiffs' claim depended upon "establishing that the motiva-
tion for the sovereign act was bribery."81 The court held that adju-
dication of that issue would cause embarrassment and, further,
that the act of state doctrine "has traditionally barred antitrust
claims based on the defendant's alleged inducement of foreign sov-
ereign action. ' s2 The court, therefore, rejected the claim.
Despite the clear holding that the act of state doctrine bars con-
sideration of the motivation questions found in these and other
cases,83 some courts have taken a contrary position. This position
71 Id. The court assumed, without expressly stating, that the State Department's determi-
nation was irreconcilable with the plaintiffs' theory of the case.
78 Id.
7- 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984).
'o Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984
(1977).
712 F.2d 404 at 407.
" Id. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), the
Ninth Circuit rejected application of the act of state doctrine and remanded the case with
instructions to apply a three-part test of jurisdiction and comity. Id. at 609-15. See also 749
F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (same case on subsequent appeal). This test was further elabo-
rated on by the Third Circuit in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1297-98 (3rd Cir. 1979). Some of the literature concerning this issue assumes that the
Timberlane-Mannington jurisdictional/comity test would provide a substitute for act of
state considerations. See, e.g., 1 J. ATWOOD AND K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD §§ 8.06-8.09, 243-49 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as ATWOOD & BREW-
STER]; Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 560-63; Riley, supra note 4, at 526-32 (1978). Although
overlap exists between the jurisdictional/comity test and act of state considerations, the
Ninth Circuit's analysis in Clayco indicates that, at least in that court's view, one does not
substitute for the other.
S Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985); Arango v. Guzman Travel
Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980); De Roburt v. Gannett Co., 548 F. Supp.
1370, 1374 (D. Hawaii 1982); General Aircraft Corp. v. Air America, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3, 6
(D.D.C. 1979); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus. Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680,
[Vol. 15:205
19851 PETITIONING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
has its roots in United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,4 in which the
government alleged that the defendants conspired to monopolize
the sisal market by, among other things, securing legislation from
the Mexican and Yucatan governments that recognized the defen-
dants as the exclusive buyers of sisal. The Supreme Court reversed
dismissal of the action, holding that American Banana was distin-
guishable. The distinction, however, was based primarily upon
American Banana's jurisdictional holding.8 5 The Court did note
that, although the conspirators were aided by foreign legislation, it
was "by their own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere, that they
689-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (this court, however, notes an exception for "corruption of govern-
ment officials," which may be inconsistent with Clayco); Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace
Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (inquiry into whether defendant improperly
influenced government decision would not be allowed); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. But-
tes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 110 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); cf. Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exchange Ass'n
of Illinois, Inc., 729 F.2d 1128, 1131 (7th Cir. 1984) (defendant legislators entitled to immu-
nity when cause of action depended on proof of their motive), cert. dismissed sub nom.
Thillens, Inc. v. Wall, 105 S. Ct. 375 (1984).
See also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977) (vacat-
ing and remanding dismissals by Judge Burke of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (dismissing com-
plaints for lack of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1984).
Where the court said that while it would not "impugn ... the nobility of a foreign na-
tion's motivation," the court was nevertheless "interested in the depth and nature of its
interest" in determining whether a case should be dismissed on act of state grounds. 549
F.2d 597 at 607. Despite its interest, the court reversed an order dismissing the case on act
of state grounds. The court found that the alleged acts of the foreign government, which
included court proceedings and the use of guards and troops to shut down the plaintiff's
operations, did not reflect a "sovereign decision" that the plaintiff's business should be crip-
pled, and were therefore not acts of state. The court thus avoided the motivation question.
Id. at 608.
84 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
In American Banana, 213 U.S. 347 (1909), the Court found that because the conduct
occurred outside the United States, "[i]t is surprising to hear it argued that [the conduct is]
governed by the act of Congress . . . .A conspiracy in this country to do acts in another
jurisdiction does not draw to itself those acts and make them unlawful, if they are permitted
by the local law." Id. at 355, 359. In Sisal, 274 U.S. 268 (1927), on the other hand, the
conspiracy was "entered into by parties within the United States and made effective by acts
done therein." The object was control of the sisal market both internally and externally.
The injury was thus to the United States, "not merely of something done by another gov-
ernment at the instigation of private parties." Id. at 276. The view in American Banana
that the antitrust laws do not apply to combinations outside the United States has been
repudiated. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977) (va-
cating and remanding dismissals by Judge Burke of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (dismissing com-
plaints for lack of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens), afJ'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1984).
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brought about forbidden results within the United States. 8 6 The
conspirators' acts were not limited to soliciting the foreign legisla-
tion. 7 Soliciting the legislation was nevertheless an important part
of the conspiracy, and the Court implicitly assumed a provable
causal connection between the solicitation and the resulting
legislation.
Relying in part on Sisal, the Fifth Circuit rejected the American
Banana and Hunt approaches in Industrial Investment Develop-
ment Corp. v. Mitsui & Co.85 The plaintiffs here alleged that, al-
though they had formed a joint venture with an Indonesian com-
pany to harvest logs in that country and had negotiated with the
government for a necessary license, the license was never issued
due to the influence of the defendants. After the trial court dis-
missed the complaint based on Hunt, the Fifth Circuit reversed.
The court of appeals found that the validity of the Indonesian gov-
ernment's behavior was not at issue and, moreover, that the plain-
tiffs did not need to prove to any degree of certainty that the li-
cense would have issued had the defendants not interfered. Rather,
it was enough for the plaintiffs to show that the defendants caused
the "potential" of the plaintiff's commercial venture "to die aborn-
ing."89 While it was essential to prove a causal relationship be-
tween the defendants' actions and the harm suffered, the plaintiffs
did not have to prove that the defendants were the sole cause of
their injury. Finally, the court disagreed with Hunt that "motiva-
tion and validity are equally protected by the act of state rubric,"
especially "where adjudication would result in no embarrassment
to executive department action."90
274 U.S. at 276.
87 Id. at 272-74.
594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980).
ag Id. at 54.
90 Id. at 55, citing Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690
(1962), and Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977) (va-
cating and remanding dismissals by Judge Burke of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (dismissing com-
plaints for lack of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens), afj'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1984). Continental Ore does not really support the Fifth Circuit's proposition; motivation
there was not an issue. The Court held in Continental Ore only that the exercise of discre-
tionary power conferred upon the defendant by a foreign government was not protected by
the act of state doctrine when the power was exercised to exclude a competitor. The Court
did say, however, that the defendants would not be insulated from liability just because
their conspiracy "involved some acts by the agent of a foreign government." 370 U.S. at 706.
Timberlane would appear to support the Fifth Circuit, but only to the extent it leaves open
the possibility of litigating a foreign government's motivation if the government's interest in
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Another noteworthy case is Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.9 1
Here the Third Circuit held that the act of state doctrine would
not bar adjudication of a claim that the defendant monopolized
the jet engine market by, inter alia, persuading foreign govern-
ments not to purchase from the plaintiff. The court found the com-
mercial exception to the act of state doctrine inapplicable,92 and
distinguished Hunt on the ground that it involved an expropria-
tion. 3 The court conceded that acquiring evidence to prove the
causal connection may be difficult, but left open the possible use of
"other sources of proof" if direct evidence was unavailable. 4 Fi-
nally, the court observed that the act of state doctrine should not
be applied "in the absence of a showing that adjudication may hin-
der international relations."95
2. Policy Considerations
Whether the act of state doctrine should be held to bar consider-
ation of a foreign government's motive is a difficult policy question.
Considerations favoring a bar include possible political embarrass-
ment to the United States, as Hunt suggested. Another considera-
tion is the difficulty of proving the causal connection 6 and foreign
the subject matter of the litigation is sufficiently small.
694 F.2d 300 (3rd Cir. 1982).
Id. at 302; see also infra notes 106-19 and accompanying text.
694 F.2d at 304.
94 Id., citing Continental Ore.
*6 Id., citing Mitsui and Timberlane. See also Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F.
Supp. 896 (E.D. Mich. 1981), a military procurement case involving illegal foreign kickbacks,
where the court noted that "damage-related act of state issues are not as significant as those
implicated when the judicial inquiry will more directly evaluate the justification or validity
of a foreign act of state." Id. at 909. The court here criticized Hunt and relied upon its
exception for foreign corruption in denying the defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment on act of state grounds, even though the foreign government's reasons for the
action it took were in issue. Cf. Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983) (another military procurement case in
which the court reversed an act of state dismissal on grounds that the plaintiff could estab-
lish fact of damage without references to lost sales to foreign governments). Foreign govern-
ment motivation was considered in non-antitrust contexts in Empresa Cubana Exportadora
De Azucar y Sus Derivados v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1981) (intent of
Cuba in seizing assets discussed); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975); Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
" In United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231 (1980), cert.
denied and appeal dimissed, 451 U.S. 901 (1981), for example, the court observed that the
absence of discovery abroad of alleged cartel activity "has made it impossible" to determine
whether a foreign government was involved in the activity, id. at 259, but nevertheless re-
jected the act of state and foreign compulsion defenses. Id. at 263. The weight to be ac-
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
resentment resulting from attempts to do so. Proving the causal
connection is difficult not only because of the problem of con-
ducting discovery in foreign countries, but also because govern-
ments are multi-faceted entities rarely motivated by only one fac-
tor; each government act may involve multiple actors, each with
his own reason for acting. Foreign resentment may occur because
the foreign government may regard its actions as an internal mat-
ter of no concern to outsiders and because, as American Banana
hinted, the antitrust court's investigation may come to a conclu-
sion inconsistent with the foreign government's official reasons for
acting.97 Potential for unfairness resulting from these problems ex-
ists for both the plaintiff and the defendant, but it may impact the
defendant more seriously, because the foreign government act, oc-
curring later in time than the defendant's attempted inducement,
will often appear to have been caused by it.
On the other hand, it is naive to assume that the United States
will inevitably be embarrassed in its conduct of foreign relations,
or, at least, that such embarrassment is necessarily sufficient to bar
enforcement of United States antitrust policy. 8 Moreover, given
the creativeness of modern courts in fashioning rules of fairness,
difficulty of proof may be an insufficient justification for refusing a
case. From a plaintiff's point of view, the risk of not being able to
introduce proper evidence is surely preferable to not being permit-
ted to proceed at all. And whatever unfairness to a defendant re-
sults from a post hoc ergo propter hoc presumption may be coun-
tered by other factors, such as the foreign government's interest in
making available evidence demonstrating that the government's
corded a foreign government's statement regarding its own conduct is considered in Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1191, 1192 & n.121, 1193 &
n.122, 1194-95 (E.D. Pa. 1981); cf. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138,
1149 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
' See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 68.
'8 Indeed, one need only review the recent Laker litigation for an example of United
States court resolve in enforcing the antitrust laws in the face of foreign retaliation in the
form of jurisdiction-ousting court decrees. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgium World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan American World Air-
ways, 604 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1984). Foreign resentment evidenced by legislation barring
United States discovery procedures abroad and nullifying the effect abroad of antitrust
judgments entered in the United States has generally failed to inhibit the enthusiasm of
United States courts in enforcing the antitrust laws. See HAWK, supra note 3, at 315-42 and
Supp. 1982 at 71-85; Davis, supra note 68, at 435-37; Joelson, International Antitrust:
Problems and Defenses, 15 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 1121, 1126-29 (1983). See generally
ATwooD & BEWSTER, supra note 82, §§ 4.06-4.18 (2d ed. 1981). Such fierce insensitivity to
foreign policy implications would logically lead to abandonment of the act of state doctrine.
222 [Vol. 15:205
PETITIONING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
action was totally unrelated to the defendant's petitioning activ-
ity.9 As to the difficulty of isolating the defendant's influence on
the foreign government from among all other possible influences,
perhaps a "principal motivation" test could be used.100 This diffi-
culty, in any event, does not bar application of the antitrust laws
in domestic situations where similar multiple motivations for offi-
cal conduct may be present.10
The question is obviously one that needs to be resolved by the
Supreme Court. Pending such a resolution, application of the act
of state doctrine will continue to be triggered in most circuits 02
when a foreign government's motive arises as an issue.
3. Implications for Noerr-Pennington
As can be seen, the distinction between validity and motive may
defeat the defense of act of state, depending on the circuit. This
distinction will not, however, affect the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine. Absent sham activity, which would make the doctrine inap-
plicable, the courts are not concerned with whether the challenged
conduct succeeded in motivating the government entity; they are
willing to assume that it did. The defendant is nevertheless
shielded from liability because of the protected nature of its con-
duct. Application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine may thus have
caused a different result in some of the cases discussed above. In-
ducing legislation, for example, as in Sisal, is one of the activities
most closely guarded by Noerr-Pennington.0 3 Thus, in those cir-
" Cf. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (where
several defendants invoking the protection of foreign laws were supported by amicus briefs
filed by the foreign countries involved.)
100 Cf. the "principal purpose" test discussed infra, note 187 and accompanying text.
101 In domestic state action cases, for example, a key criterion for application of the
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1945), immunity doctrine is whether the state legislation in
question "contemplated" the anticompetitive conduct of the local governmental entity. See,
e.g., City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Eight Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978); Tom Hudson &
Assoc. v. City of Chula Vista, 746 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3503
(1985); Scott v. City of Sioux City, Iowa, 736 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 1864 (1985). But see Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exchange Assoc. of Illinois,
729 F.2d 1128, 1131 (7th Cir. 1984) (when conspiracy theory depended upon proof of defen-
dant legislators' motives, legislation would be immune from liability), cert. dismissed sub
nom. Thillens, Inc. v. Wall, 105 S. Ct. 375 (1984). See also AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 68
11 204d, 203.3d (Supp. 1982).
' See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
103 See generally Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir.
1975). What other impediment may have prevented application of the doctrine in Sisal and
the other cases discussed at notes 84-95, however, is not clear. Courts have held, for exam-
ple, that where the defendant's conduct, which is otherwise protected, is part of a broader
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cuits where the act of state defense is vulnerable on the motive
question, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine could prove to be a more
stable defense.
To the extent that the act of state doctrine bars consideration of
motive, however, the protection afforded antitrust defendants by
Noerr-Pennington will be redundant, at least in actions for dam-
ages. 104 Indeed, so long as the act of state doctrine forbids courts to
inquire into the causal connection between a defendant's conduct
and a foreign government's subsequent action, not even Noerr-
Pennington's sham exception rules will have any application.0 5
B. Commercial Activity
Both the act of state and the Noerr-Pennington defenses exhibit
a certain weakness when the government action being induced is
considered to be a "commercial activity." This weakness stems
from the attitude that when a government body enters into an eco-
nomic market as an ordinary buyer or seller, persons dealing with
it should be treated as dealing with any other entrepreneur and be
subject to the same restrictions as in any other commercial
situation.
1. Commercial Exception/Acts of State
As discussed earlier, a commercial exception to the act of state
doctrine was recognized by a plurality of the Court in Dunhill.'06
This position is consistent with the "restrictive" principle of sover-
eign immunity adopted by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 (FSIA). e7 That Act removes the immunity of foreign gov-
ernments to suit in United States courts in cases stemming from
foreign state commercial activites having an impact on the United
States. The FSIA declares that the commercial character of an ac-
anticompetitive scheme - such as may have been the case in Sisal - the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine may be inapplicable. See infra note 206 and accompanying text. Whether
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies may also depend on the nature of the inducements
used and the kinds of government bodies being induced.
', Professor Hawk points out that the distinction between motive and validity may have
no relevance in private actions for injunctive relief, where section 4 of the Clayton Act,
providing for recovery of private damages, has no application. HAWK, supra note 3, at 143-
44.
10" See infra notes 164-65 and 182-215, and accompanying text. But see McManis, supra
note 68, at 235-39, which expresses the view that the act of state doctrine should not protect
payments abroad.
' See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
107 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982). See McManis, supra note 68, at 234.
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tivity is to be determined by reference to the activity's "nature"
rather than by reference to its "purpose."'' 0 8 Under this definition
the "essentially commercial nature of an activity" is determinative,
so that a government contract for the purchase of goods or ser-
vices, even if used for public purposes, would be considered com-
mercial in nature. 09
Most courts since Dunhill have assumed the existence of a com-
mercial exception to the act of state doctrine, but they have not
been consistent in deciding what constitutes commercial activity.
Courts have held, for example, that the purchase of cement for
military purposes, 110 the purchase of armored cars,"' the services
performed by an international freight forwarder on behalf of the
Iranian Air Force,' and the sale of golf carts by a government
agency" 3 are all commercial activities. On the other hand, courts
have ruled that military procurements," 4 a decision to disallow im-
portation of nonmilitary airplanes, 1 5 and regulations preventing a
nationalized bank from performing its contracted obligations" 6 are
noncommercial acts of state.
The Ninth Circuit introduced further confusion in this area with
its decision in International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
("OPEC")." 7 This case did not involve petitioning activity, but it
'" Id. § 1603(d) (1982).
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6615. In Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, Tass, 443 F.
Supp. 849, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), however, the court held that the commercial exception does
not apply in a libel action to the acts of two Soviet news agencies that sent allegedly libelous
materials into the United States, because these agencies were engaged in acts of intergov-
ernmental cooperation. The court also found that one of the defendants, which was arguably
only 63 percent owned by the foreign government, qualified for FSIA protection. See also In
re Complaint of Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561, 566 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (exploratory drilling by
national oil company was not commercial).
Io National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 641-42
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979).
., Sage International, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 908-11 (E.D. Mich.
1981).
..2 Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 396, 400-01 (D.N.J.
1979).
H3 Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 394-95 (D. Del. 1978).
Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
"s Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300 (3rd Cir. 1982). A government loan was
held to be an act of state in DeRoburt v. Gannet Co., 548 F. Supp. 1370, 1376-77 (D. Hawaii
1982), rev'd, 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984).
H Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
"7 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
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did examine the commercial exception to the act of state doctrine.
The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the price-fixing activi-
ties of the OPEC countries. In affirming dismissal of the case on
the basis of the act of state doctrine, the court rejected the "objec-
tive nature-of-the-act test" of the FSIA. Indeed, the court stated
that the concept of act of state "is not diluted by the commercial
activity exception," although "purely commercial activity may not
rise to the level of an act of state."'1 8 Furthermore, the court ruled
that the act of state doctrine could be applicable even when the
doctrine of sovereign immunity is not. The former, it commented,
applied here because of foreign policy implications and the court's
recognition of state sovereignty over natural resources."89 Both the
holding and dicta of this case are inconsistent with the FSIA ex-
ception for commercial activities.2 0
2. Commercial Exception/Noerr-Pennington
Confusion also exists in the Noerr-Pennington cases regarding
the existence of a commercial exception. 2' The question has arisen
only in cases where the defendant has dealt with the governmental
entity not as a regulator, but as a purchaser of goods or services. 2
Two early expositions of the commercial exception are George R.
Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.2 3 and Hecht v.
Pro-Football, Inc. 24 In the former case the court opined that the
118 Id. at 1360.
" Id. at 1361. Cf. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404,
408 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984) ("[glranting a concession to exploit
natural resources entails an exercise of powers peculiar to a sovereign").
120 See also Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd on
other grounds, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979) (foreign government's inducement of state-owned
oil corporation to breach contract was not a commercial act). The inconsistency noted in the
text is more fully discussed in Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 563-68, and Comment, Act of
State and Sovereign Immunities Doctrines: The Need to Establish Congruity, 17 U.S.F.L.
REV. 91, 105-12 (1982), the latter of which argues that the act of state doctrine should not be
applied to prevent adjudication under the FSIA.
121 Pennington, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963), could be construed as authority that a com-
mercial exception does not exist, but the issue was not there raised. See Fischel, supra note
68 at 85-86.
121 One commentator has suggested that the commercial exception to petitioning immu-
nity should not apply when the government entity is acting as a seller. Comment, Noerr-
Pennington Antitrust Immunity and Proprietary Government Activity, 1981 ARIz. ST. L.J.
749, 760-61 (1981). While the issue does not appear to have arisen in any reported case,
applicability of the exception may depend upon whether the purpose of the selling activity
is purely economic or whether it involves regulatory or other social objectives as well.
424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
124 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
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Noerr umbrella should not apply "to public officials engaged in
purely commercial dealings," finding support for its view in Conti-
nental Ore. " ' The court hypothesized that a different result would
have followed in Continental Ore had the defendants sought a
change of policy from executive or legislative officials instead of
trying to subvert the rationing program.'26 In Hecht, the District of
Columbia Circuit suggested that under the authority of Trucking
Unlimited,'7 which had then just been decided by the Ninth Cir-
cuit, governmental agencies charged with procurement were in a
position similar to adjudicative agencies, to which modified Noerr-
Pennington considerations applied. 2 8 The District of Columbia
Circuit confirmed its recognition of the commercial exception after
the Supreme Court's Trucking Unlimited decision.'
2 9
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has since flatly rejected
any commercial exception to Noerr-Pennington in In re Airport
Car Rental Antitrust Litigation.'3 0 It did, however, temper its re-
jection somewhat by noting that "the nature of the government
activity is one factor in determining the type of public input ac-
ceptable to the particular decision-making process.'' This dictum
seems to adopt an approach similar to Hecht. Relying upon In re
Whitten, 424 F.2d at 33.
126 Id. The theory touched upon in Whitten and more fully elaborated in Woods Explora-
tion & Producing Co. v. Aluminium Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972), that Noerr-Pennington insulates only attempts to influ-
ence broad policy questions but not narrow issues between specific parties, has been criti-
cized. See Reaemco, Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 496 F. Supp. 546, 556 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
12 See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text for discussion of Trucking Unlimited.
128 Hecht, 444 F.2d at 942. The Ninth Circuit itself appeared to adopt Whitten's commer-
cial exception in Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers
Local No. 150, 440 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971).
"29 Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Assoc., 663 F.2d 253, 263-
64 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1981). See also Household Goods Carriers'
Bureau v. Terrell, 452 F.2d 152, 158-59 & n.18 (5th Cir. 1971) (court appears to adopt the
commercial exception in the footnote but observes that the point was not preserved for
appeal); F. Buddie Contracting, Inc. v. Seawright, 47 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
757, 760 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 1984); City of Atlanta v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 1982-1 TRADE
CAS. (CCH) T 64,527, at 72,928 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W.
Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 689-90 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In three other cases involving
private corporations dealing with a government entity in the capacity of a purchaser, the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine was found inapplicable for reasons other than the commercial
exception. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 841-43 (9th Cir. 1980); Kurek v.
Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580, 593 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated and re-
manded, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), on remand, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1090 (1979); Duke & Co., Inc. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3rd Cir. 1975).
120 693 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3114 (1983).
131 Id.
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Airport Car Rental, the Fifth Circuit also rejected a commercial
exception in Greenwood Utilities Commission v. Mississippi
Power Co.,132 even though it seemed to recognize instances where
"all would agree" that the exception should apply.
3. Scope of the Exception
Notwithstanding the Ninth and Fifth Circuits' recent pro-
nouncements, most circuits will continue to recognize some form of
commercial exception s in both act of state and Noerr-Pennington
cases. To the extent the exception is recognized, the courts should
restrict it to situations where the government entity itself engages
in a trading activity. The problem arises in deciding what, if any,
further restrictions should be placed on the exception. In address-
ing that problem, one should consider whether the liability of the
petitioner is to be coextensive with that of the entity being peti-
tioned, i.e., whether the petitioner may be held liable when the
government entity cannot, and vice versa. While disagreement on
this issue exists at the domestic level,134 different considerations
.3' 751 F.2d 1484, 1505 & n.14 (5th Cir. 1985). The court stated in note 14 that:
All would agree that antitrust liability should not attach in exclusive franchise
agreements ...and that, conversely, if as the result of a price fixing agreement
by private parties the government pays more for products it purchases in the mar-
ketplace, the participants in the anticompetitive scheme should not escape liabil-
ity because of the identity of the victim.
Another case has held that Noerr-Pennington protected an alleged conspiracy to persuade
local governmental authorities to adopt specifications that would have the effect of barring
local governments from purchasing competitors' products. United States v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440, 452-53 (E.D. Pa. 1966). See also Household Goods Carrier Bureau
v. Terrel, 452 F.2d 152, 156-57 (5th Cir. 1971) (lobbying the U.S. Department of Defense to
discontinue considering a competitor's product for purchase was protected by Noerr-Pen-
nington). Still another case has rejected the reasoning of the courts recognizing the commer-
cial exception, but in a regulatory rather than a strict commercial setting. Bustop Shelters,
Inc. v. Convenience & Safety Corp., 521 F. Supp. 989, 996 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The issue
here was whether the defendant's inducement activities with respect to the granting of a
franchise were proper. The court noted in footnote nine that the granting of a government
franchise is not a commercial activity but a sovereign act. The court relied heavily on the
Seventh Circuit's similar decision in Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d
220 (7th Cir. 1975).
133 See Fischel, supra note 68, at 117-18; ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 66, at 54-55;
ATWOOD & BREWSTE, supra note 82, § 8.09 (2d ed. 1981). The commercial exception should
not apply to the sovereign compulsion defense. HAWK, supra note 3, at 155-56. But see
ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 66, at 55 n.100.
1 Compare Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220, 229 (7th Cir.
1975) ("since the governmental actions ...were not themselves subject to the Sherman
Act, the same was true under Noerr of the concerted efforts to induce those governmental
actions"); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072, 1091 (N.D. Cal.
1979) ("[tlhe courts should be reluctant to extend immunity to private parties who have
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apply at the international level. Specifically, Congress, through the
FSIA, has determined that foreign countries should normally be
held liable for their commercial acts under the antitrust laws. Con-
gress has made no such determination as to states.1 35 Because both
foreign governments and persons petitioning them may incur anti-
trust liability for commercial transactions, the same transactions
should give rise to that liability for both classes of defendants.1 3
To the extent that the FSIA defines the limits of foreign govern-
ments' immunity, therefore, that Act will have a bearing on the
scope of the commercial exception to the petitioning defenses. The
problem with the definition of commercial acts adopted by the
FSIA and the Dunhill plurality, however, is that it sometimes re-
quires United States courts to pass on the validity of foreign gov-
ernment acts in politically sensitive, albeit commercial, areas.1 37 A
court must then choose between the competing policies of recog-
nizing commercial liability and avoiding a decision that may have
international repercussions. The Ninth Circuit found the latter
concern paramount in OPEC, s6 but its decision cannot be taken as
an indication that every purchase or sale by a foreign government
is exempt from the antitrust laws. Few would disagree, for exam-
ple, that golf cart sales would normally be an appropriate target of
antitrust regulation, whether the sales are by a private or public
sought to influence government activity that would not be protected under the state action
doctrine"); and Huron Valley Hospital, Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301, 1315
(E.D. Mich. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981) ("Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity presupposes Parker v. Brown immunity"), with In re Airport Car Rental
Antitrust Litigation, 521 F. Supp. 568, 584 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 693 F.2d 84 (9th Cir.
1982) ("there is ... no necessary or logical relationship between the imposition of liability
on those who advocate anticompetitive activities and on those who participate in them");
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 68, 203.2a, 212.6 (Supp. 1982); Fischel, supra note 68, at
94-95.
"35 Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989, 1995 (1984) (action of state legislature in adopting
legislation "ipso facto" is immune from antitrust laws); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-
51 (1943). Under Parker v. Brown and its progeny, states are immune from antitrust liabil-
ity. In general, political subdivisions of states share in the immunity to the extent that their
anticompetitive conduct is shown to be part of a "clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed state policy." Active state supervision is not required for immunity. See Town of
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989, 1995
(1984); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54 (1982); Califor-
nia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midland Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980); Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1975). But see Limeco, Inc. v. Division of
Lime, 546 F. Supp. 868, 869-71 (N.D. Miss. 1982) (no state action exemption when state
enters the commercial market).
131 Cf. ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 82, § 5.18 n.133.
See HAWK, supra note 3, at Supp. 41-43.
" See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
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entity. But if the golf cart sales represented an important expendi-
ture of national resources, or if they were supervised closely by the
foreign government's chief executive or a special cabinet depart-
ment, or if they otherwise involved the making of important policy
decisions, it may well follow that they should qualify for immunity
under the OPEC theory of act of state. 13
9
To give due weight to these competing concerns, a combination
of factors must be used in determining whether the commercial ex-
ception applies. These factors include: (1) the political and eco-
nomic importance of the trading activity to the United States gov-
ernment, (2) its importance to the foreign government, (3) the
purpose for which the goods are to be used, (4) the foreign govern-
ment personnel involved in directing the trading activity, and (5)
the probable international political repercussions. 140 Application of
these factors necessarily complicates the bright line approach of
the FSIA. By narrowing the scope of the commercial exception,
however, this multi-factored analysis diminishes the exception's
importance as a consideration in international petitioning cases. It
also leaves foreign governments free to pursue their important na-
tional policies without the interference of United States antitrust
law.
Once the foreign government act qualifies as "noncommercial,"
petitioning activities seeking to influence that act should be im-
mune, subject to other applicable restraints on petitioning activ-
ity.1 4' In most cases it will be immaterial whether the petitioner's
139 Cf. Greenwood Utilities Commission v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484, 1505
(5th Cir. 1985) (rejecting commercial exception because the government can engage in a
policy decision at the same time it acts as a participant in the marketplace); Comment, The
Act of State Doctrine: The Need for a Commercial Exception in Antitrust Litigation, 18
SAN DIEGo L. REV. 813, 827-28 (1981) ("if the court wishes to review the actions of a foreign
government in a commercial matter it need only apply a strict definition of 'act of state' and
thus deny the action its sovereign status").
140 See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 68, 1 239b (Supp. 1982). HAWK, supra note 3, at
133-34; Comment, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State: The Need for a
Commercial Act Exception to the Commercial Act Exception, 17 U.S.F.L. REV. 763, 787-92
(1983). Cf. S. 397, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), which would require a court to dismiss a
private antitrust suit challenging foreign conduct if the court concluded that the interests of
a foreign nation were paramount to those of the United States.
"' These restraints may consist of various exceptions to the petitioning doctrines, as well
as separate legislation prohibiting certain kinds of petitioning activity. Examples of separate
legislation are the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982)) which prohibits payments by United States concerns to foreign
governments, and the Trading With the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-39, 41-44 (1982)), which allows the President to restrict
trade with foreign governments under specified circumstances.
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immunity applies by virtue of the act of state doctrine or Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, for the two will reinforce each other. If one is
found inapplicable, however-if, for example, the Bernstein excep-
tion prevents application of the act of state doctrine-the court
should permit appropriate reliance on the other so as not to defeat
the defendant's reasonable legal expectations. 2
C. Nature of the Government Entity
The level or importance of the government entity being peti-
tioned has played a significant role in determining the availability
of an inducement defense. In the act of state area, this factor is
sometimes considered in an effort to determine whether a particu-
lar act is an act of state. In the Noerr-Pennington cases, this factor
is used to determine the appropriateness of specific inducement ac-
tivity. In general, the closer the government act is to the Executive
or legislature, the greater the protection will be for the conduct
inducing that act.
1. Nature/Act of State
American courts have generally refrained from defining precisely
when an act of a foreign government entity becomes an act of
state. Often, the courts presume that the foreign government act
qualifies as an act of state without any real discussion or analy-
sis. 43 This is especially the case when the executive branch is in-
volved, 14 4 or when the government entity is performing acts tradi-
tionally recognized as acts of state.14 5
Not all acts of foreign governments, however, have been consid-
ered acts of state. According to the RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RE-
""2 Cf. In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 521 F. Supp. 568, 584-85 (N.D. Cal.
1981), aff'd, 693 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982), in which the court expressed concern that relating
Noerr-Pennington to Parker v. Brown would create unpredictability for persons seeking to
influence public officials.
"I See, e.g., General Aircraft Corp. v. Air America, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3, 6-7 (D.D.C.
1979).
14 See, e.g., DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 548 F. Supp. 1370, 1376-84 (D. Hawaii 1982), rev'd
on other grounds, 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984) (libel suit brought by President of Nauru
barred by act of state); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp.
92, 98-101, 108-13 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972) (consideration of attempts to influence ruler of the Trucial
State Sharjah was barred by act of state).
145 See, e.g., Empresa Cubana Exportadora De Azucar y Sus Derivados v. Lamborn & Co.,
652 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1981) (expropriation is "a classic act of state"); Bokkelen v.
Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (control of foreign trade
by denial of import licenses is an act of state).
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LATIONS, for a government act to qualify as an act of state it must
involve "the public interests of a state as a state."14 Applying this
guideline, the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America held that judicial decrees resulting from proceedings initi-
ated by a defendant in a foreign court did not amount to acts of
state.1" 7 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that there was no indication
that the decrees, which had the effect of crippling the plaintiff's
operations, reflected a "sovereign decision."' 4 The RESTATEMENT
itself notes that a judgment of a foreign court may be an act of
state but usually is not because it involves only the interests of
private litigants.4 9
Similarly, in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 50 the
Third Circuit held that a ministerial act performed by a govern-
ment agency, such as the granting of a patent, does not rise to the
level of an act of state. The Third Circuit subsequently clarified
that its decision was limited to ministerial acts that are not of sub-
stantial concern to the executive branch in its conduct of interna-
tional affairs. 15'
Courts have also held that government agencies vested only with
commercial, as distinguished from governmental, authority func-
tion outside the realm of the act of state doctrine. 52 As the OPEC
case well demonstrates, however, commercial acts performed by a
146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 41 comment d (1965). See also Note,
The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and the Petitioning of Foreign Goverments, 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 1343, 1364-66 (1984) (discussing various criteria).
,' Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1977) (va-
cating and remanding dismissals by Judge Burke of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (dismissing com-
plaints for lack of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1984).
"40 549 F.2d 597 at 608. Cf. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 272 (1927)
(lien foreclosures were alleged to have been among the defendant's illegal acts); Dominicus
Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(defendant was alleged, among other things, to have engaged in meritless litigation in a
foreign court).
119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 41 comment d (1965). See also
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 607-08. The court in Timberlane did not consider the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine.
1-50 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3rd Cir. 1979). See also Forbo-Giunbiasco S.A. v. Congoleum
Corp., 516 F. Supp. 1210, 1217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (relying upon Mannington).
1 Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 303 (3rd Cir. 1982).
152 See generally Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 693-94
(1976) (joined in by a majority). See also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp.
384, 397-98 (D. Del. 1978) ("agency or instrumentality" of Polish government that exported
golf carts was not vested with status of a foreign nation).
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central branch of government may be deemed to be acts of state. 5 '
Finally, neither acts by foreign government officials for their own
financial benefit nor conduct that violates the laws of the foreign
government 54 constitutes an act of state. 55
These examples show that whether an act of a foreign govern-
ment will be held to constitute an act of state depends on various
circumstances. 15 The guiding question is the degree to which the
agency is acting on behalf of the government and is carrying out its
policies. 57 Ironically, the act of state doctrine itself limits a plain-
tiff's ability to prove that an official's conduct was undertaken
's' See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
' Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311
F.2d 547, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1962). But see AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 68 239b (Supp.
1982). See also Symposium - Federal Jurisdiction, Human Rights, and the Law of Nations:
Essays on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305 (1981).
The courts have also held that conduct by a foreign government inconsistent with United
States policy, if it impacts directly upon property in the United States, is not an act of state.
F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 487-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 375
F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967) (foreign confiscatory decrees
purporting to divest foreign nationals of property in the United States are given no effect by
United States courts). See also Allied Bank International v. Banko Credito Agricola De-
Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521-22 (2d Cir. 1985) (act of state doctrine would not apply in debt
repayment dispute where situs of debt was determined to be the United States); Weston
Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, 456 N.Y.S.2d 684, 687-88 (1982) (act of state
doctrine does not apply to foreign government attempt to alter terms of promissory note
when "debt sought to be enforced was not located within the State whose acts are said to be
dispositive"); Linseman v. World Hockey Association, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (D. Conn.
1977) ("act of state doctrine shields only conduct which is perpetrated within the territorial
boundaries of the foreign country").
115 One state court has held that acts by officers of a foreign city were not acts of state
because the act of state doctrine requires the action to "have been taken by the sovereign
nation rather than a subdivision of that government." In re Adoption by McElroy, 522
S.W.2d 345, 349 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1024 (1975). See also Ameri-
can Industrial Contracting, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Pa.
1971) (doctrines of international law apply only to nations, not to provinces such as Que-
bec). These authorities have been criticized. ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 68 at 253. In
light of the fact that nongovernmental bodies may perform acts of state, see infra note 156
and accompanying text, the holdings of these cases are inappropriate.
'" The Supreme Court suggested in Continental Ore that even a private entity could
perform acts of state if the entity received proper authorization and direction from the gov-
ernment. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Co., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07
(1962). The Court observed, however, that nothing in the record indicated that Canadian
law compelled the discriminatory purchases undertaken by the defendant or that any Cana-
dian official "approved or would have approved of joint efforts to monopolize." This state-
ment suggests that a different result would have been reached had the necessary authoriza-
tion been shown. See also ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 66, at 54-55 (action of
nongovernmental agent, if clearly "authorized to perform the alleged acts of state as a dele-
gated sovereign function," may constitute act of state).
117 See HAWK, supra note 3, at 128-29.
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without authority under the foreign government's law. For exam-
ple, acceptance of a bribe payment by a government official will
not constitute an act of state unless the official was acting within
the scope of his official authority. 158 But proving that the official
acted without authority may require the plaintiff to produce evi-
dence of official misconduct, something that is usually forbidden
by the act of state doctrine. If the foreign government has repudi-
ated or condemned the official's act, the United States court may
proceed without concern for act of state considerations. 159 If it has
not, however, the court must limit itself to a cursory analysis of the
official's conduct. In this situation the level of importance of the
government official will prove to be significant. The higher his sta-
tus within the government, the greater the presumption will be
that he acted with government authority. The lower his status-or
if the official was outside the government, as in Continental
Ore-the greater the presumption will be that he acted without
governmental authority and the more penetrating the court's anal-
ysis of his authority may be. A finding that a low level official ac-
ted beyond his authority will be unlikely to have foreign policy
repercussions.
2. Nature/Noerr-Pennington
Like the act of state doctrine, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
may apply to all levels of government, but the degree of its protec-
tion among these levels varies markedly. The greatest degree of
protection applies to activities directed toward the "political"
branches of government, i.e., the executive and legislative
branches.160 The extent of the protection typically afforded is illus-
' See D. I. Baker, Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Economic Pol-
icy of the House Committee on International Relations, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 50,238 at
p. 55,446 (1975).
" Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 690
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (repudiated government act could not give rise to act of state defense). See
also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980) (court doubted whether action
by foreign government official in violation of laws of the foreign country and unratified by
the government could be characterized as an act of state); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d
547 (5th Cir. 1962) (Venezuela sought extradition of former government official; act of state
defense not applicable).
'60 See Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co., 404 U.S. 508, 512-13
(1972). See, e.g., First American Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title Association, 714 F.2d
1439, 1446-47 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 709 (1984); Gambrel v. Kentucky
Board of Dentistry, 689 F.2d 612, 620-21 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1209 (1983);
Bustop Shelters, Inc. v. Convenience & Safety Corp., 521 F. Supp. 989, 994-95 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagan Real Estate, Inc. 454 F. Supp. 1124, 1132-33 (N.D.N.Y.
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trated by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Metro Cable Co. v.
CATV of Rockford, Inc., 6 ' in which the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants used both payments of money and misrepresentations
to induce a city council to grant a cable television franchise. Al-
though other courts had found these types of activities to give rise
to antitrust liability when used to influence judicial or administra-
tive officials, 1 2 the Seventh Circuit nevertheless held them im-
mune from antitrust liability in the legislative context. It did so
despite its observations that the franchising function "could have
been delegated to an administrative tribunal." 16 3
Significantly less protection applies to attempts to influence gov-
ernment officials in the judicial and administrative areas, as
Trucking Unlimited indicates."" How much less is defined by the
1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1372 (2d 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978). The broad protec-
tion applies to indirect attempts to influence the legislature, such as pressuring businesses
not to do business in a state until legislation is passed, Missouri v. National Organization for
Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1309-16 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980), or at-
tempting to influence voters in an election, Subscription Television, Inc. v. Southern Cali-
fornia Theatre Owners Association, 576 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1978).
There is some question whether Noerr-Pennington protection applies to all kinds of polit-
ical activity. Compare Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Service Station Dealers Associa-
tion, 499 F. Supp. 553, 557-58 (D. Del. 1980), with Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Wald-
man, 486 F. Supp. 759, 768-69 (M.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3rd
Cir. 1980), which take different approaches to the question of whether a gasoline dealer's
boycott directed at the Department of Energy could give rise to a Noerr-Pennington de-
fense. The defense extends to information given to the police that leads to anticompetitive
consequences. Ottensmeyer v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 756 F.2d 986, 993-94
(4th Cir. 1985); Forro Precission, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 673 F.2d
1045, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1982).
161 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975).
... See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
,63 Metro Cable, 516 F.2d at 228. See also First American Title Co. v. South Dakota Land
Title Association, 714 F.2d 1439, 1447 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 709 (1984)
(misrepresentations in the legislative context are constitutionally protected). Cf. Cow Pal-
ace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696, 704-05 (D. C. 1975) (bribery
allegations dismissed under Noerr-Pennington because they did not suggest a harm to
competition).
104 See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text. Conduct occurring in a private context
generally has no protection, even if it is ultimately intended to influence public regulatory
bodies. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia, 624 F.2d 476,
482 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981) (violations of statute to provoke court
challenge); Mid-Texas Communications Systems, Inc. v. American Telephone and Tele-
graph Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1382-84 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (refusal
to interconnect to provide agency review); Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad,
586 F.2d 530, 543-47 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 924 (1979). One case has held,
however, that attempts to delay the adoption of revised safety specifications by private stan-
dard-setting agencies has Noerr-Pennington protection inasmuch as the agencies' recom-
mendations were widely adopted by governmental entities. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.
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scope of the "sham exception" to Noerr-Pennington, the parame-
ters of which are discussed below."1 5 Basically, this exception ap-
plies to certain conduct purportedly designed to influence public
officials and undertaken in bad faith with the real purpose of di-
rectly restraining competition. Although conduct in the "political"
context could conceivably fall within this exception,"'6 the courts
have applied the exception almost exclusively to conduct in the ju-
dicial and administrative areas.
3. Noerr-Pennington and Foreign Subdivisions
Since the extension of the sham exception to the international
arena is unclear, it remains to be seen whether petitioners of for-
eign governments should expect varying levels of Noerr-Pen-
nington protection, depending on the nature of the government en-
tity being petitioned.1 67 Analysis of this issue must logically start
with the language of the opinion in Trucking Unlimited. Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court does not carefully articulate the ration-
ale for the distinction between the "political" and "nonpolitical"
branches of government.168 One may nevertheless infer that the
v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 573 F. Supp. 833, 838 (N.D. I11. 1983). The court there
found, moreover, that the private agencies engaged in "quasi-legislative activities," so that
attempts to influence them were judged under the same criteria as attempts to influence
legislative bodies. Id. at 841-43. See also Garst v. Stoco, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 326, 329-32 (E.D.
Ark. 1985) (statutory health agencies, although private bodies for some purposes, would be
considered government bodies for Noerr-Pennington purposes). But see American Society
of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp. 456 U.S. 556, 570-73 (1982) (nonprofit
trade association that promulgates engineering standards may be liable for issuance of an-
ticompetitive standards or guidelines); ECOS Electronics Corp. v. Underwriters Laborato-
ries, 743 F.2d 498, 501-03 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1178 (1985) (although
affirming summary judgment for the defendant, court outlines requirements for antitrust
liability for standard-making organizations); Richard Hoffman Corp. v. Integrated Building
Systems, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 367, 374 (N.D. IM. 1984) (firm hired by city to prepare specifica-
tions that prescribe use of its own products is not immune, at least where allegations of
collusion with city are present).
165 See infra notes 182-215 and accompanying text.
'" The case coming closest to recognizing sham activity in a "political" branch is Harman
v. Valley National Bank of Arizona, 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964). The plaintiff there alleged
that the defendants had conspired to induce a state attorney general to file an action that
resulted in placing a savings and loan association in receivership.
167 One of the few authorities to consider this issue, if only briefly, is ATWOOD & BREW-
STER, supra note 82, § 8.12. The authors suggest that the foreign government's political
system could be relevant to how, but not whether, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is ap-
plied. See also Comment, supra note 68, at 140-43 (1983) (advocating a "rule of reason"
approach).
16 See Fischel, supra note 68, at 98-100 (noting the Court's failure to explain why the
unethical nature of petitioning activity should be relevant in the adjudicatory context but
PETITIONING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
distinction is based upon the Court's perception that greater op-
portunities for harassment exist in "nonpolitical" arenas, that po-
litical expression has traditionally been directed toward the "polit-
ical" branches, and that the opportunities for acquiring
information in the "nonpolitical" branches are more limited than
in the other branches. These considerations necessitate differing
treatment among those seeking to exert influence. 169
These considerations, however, cannot readily be transposed to
the international scene. Political expression, for example, may be
absent from all branches of the foreign government. The govern-
ment may lack an effective information gathering apparatus at any
level. The executive branch of the government may have a tradi-
tion of accepting payments which would be considered bribes in
other parts of the world, and harassment of business competitors
in the absence of payments may be a way of life. The government,
moreover, may not be committed to a basic policy of open competi-
tion, and may otherwise be economically weak and unable to resist
the pressures for anticompetitive regulations. 170 Under some or any
of these circumstances, an extension of the sham exception rules to
all branches of a foreign government may seem justified.
Important arguments can also be made to support the theory
that the sham exception rules should not apply to any subdivision
of a foreign government. These arguments relate to the foreign
government's sensitivity to extraterritorial enforcement of United
States antitrust laws,171 and to the notion that foreign governments
should be in the best position to decide what kinds of communica-
tions within their own borders are acceptable for persons seeking
sovereign action.1 72 Also relevant is the act of state consideration
that United States courts should not become involved in adjudging
the motive or validity of foreign government decisions. This rea-
soning applies equally to decisions of ancillary branches of foreign
governments, and it would seem especially appropriate in decisions
by those branches which have no exact counterparts in the United
not in the political context).
169 Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 512-15.
170 See ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 82, § 4.03; Comment, Corporate Lobbyists
Abroad: The Extraterritorial Application of Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity, 61 CA-
LIF. L.REV. 1254, 1272-79 (1973).
' 7 See Davis, supra note 68, at 435-37 (discussing foreign blocking legislation).
172 See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 68, 239bl. "[Elvery government, whether repre-
sentative or not, is privileged to set the terms on which persons within its borders may seek
its legislation, decrees, or other sovereign action."
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States government and whose intergovernmental relationships are
difficult to discern. 173 From a business perspective, an extension of
the sham exception may effectively shackle United States busi-
nessmen from competing in the foreign country on equal footing
with other foreign businessmen. 174
In view of these countervailing considerations, adoption of a sys-
tem similar to the one now in place domestically would be desira-
ble. Such a system would allow the greatest petitioning freedom in
the executive and legislative areas, where the foreign government is
likely to be most sensitive about its sovereignty; yet it would re-
strict petitioning activity where sham-type influences are likely to
be most invidious. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,175
moreover, reduces whatever need there may be for greater court
supervision of foreign petitioning activity. That Act prohibits
United States concerns from engaging in what Congress considers
to be the most objectionable kind of foreign petitioning, payments
of money.171
Although the Fifth Circuit did not explicitly consider the issue,
it implicitly adopted the domestic sham exception rules in Coastal
States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt.177 The court there considered
whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine protected the defendant
from the antitrust consequences of litigation and threats of litiga-
tion in foreign countries. After reviewing the plaintiff's sham ex-
ception arguments, the court concluded that stipulations agreed
upon by the parties during pretrial proceedings established that
the defendant had acted in good faith sufficient to bring the for-
eign litigation within the protection of petitioning immunity. 178
The court gave no consideration to the form of governments in the
foreign countries involved.
17 Cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1191-95
(E.D. Pa. 1981), supp. op. 513 F. Supp. 1334, affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. In re
Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3rd Cir. 1983), where the court exam-
ines the role of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) vis-a-vis pric-
ing agreements among manufacturers. MITI is a cabinet-level ministry of the Japanese gov-
ernment. Id. at 1191.
' See Davis, supra note 68, at 437-38; see also HAWK, supra note 3, at 147-48.
175 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 §§ 103-04, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1982).
171 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1982).
17 694 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983).
178 Id. at 1369. See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp.
1100, 1155-57 (E.D. Pa. 1981), supp. op. 513 F. Supp. 1334, aff'd in part and rev'd in part
sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3rd Cir. 1983), where the
court again assumed that the same sham exception rules apply abroad as at home.
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The opinion in Coastal States Marketing also demonstrates that
Noerr-Pennington extends to acts of a foreign government that
may not be regarded as acts of state. As a general rule, the
broadest Noerr-Pennington protection applies to acts of state,
while the sham exception rules apply to other acts of foreign gov-
ernments. The general rule, however, has many exceptions inas-
much as an act of any branch of foreign government could conceiv-
ably qualify as an act of state, and the broad Noerr-Pennington
protection presumably applies only to the executive and legislative
branches. It is also possible that an act of even the executive or
legislative branch will not qualify as an act of state.179 In this event
the broad Noerr-Pennington protection should continue to apply
unless the act was undertaken by a government official in his pri-
vate capacity,180 in which case there would be no petitioning
immunity.
D. Sham Exception
As mentioned above, the sham activity exception to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine is based upon a private defendant's actual
purpose to restrain competition.""' It has yet to be applied in any
case decided in the international context.
1. What Constitutes Sham Activity
On the basis of Trucking Unlimited, most courts agree that a
"pattern of baseless, repetitive claims" used as an anticompetitive
device in either a judicial or administrative context gives rise to an
antitrust violation. 182 Difficulty occurs, however, in defining what
kind of suits are "baseless" and how "repetitive" they must be.
A law suit or administrative proceeding is baseless where its pur-
pose is not to involve official action by a government body, but
rather to interfere improperly with a competitor's business.'83 Im-
'79 As discussed above, the failure to qualify as an act of state could be due to various
reasons, such as application of the Bernstein exception, supra note 28, or the Hickenlooper
Amendment, supra note 16. A court might also consider the act to have been committed by
an executive or legislative official in his private capacity. See supra note 154 and accompa-
nying text.
'8 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
'82 Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 643-45 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 379-80 (1973); Ernest W.
Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 840-41 (9th Cir. 1980).
183 Hydro-Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 673 F.2d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 1982).
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proper interference occurs where the purpose of the institution of
the lawsuit or administrative filing is to suppress competition18 or
to deplete the competitor's resources with the expense of pro-
tracted litigation and negotiation. 185 Naturally, a claimant may
have various motives, proper as well as improper, for instituting a
legal proceeding against a competitor. 186 Consequently, the courts
have suggested that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the "prin-
cipal" purpose 18 or "sole" purpose 8' of the proceeding was an an-
ticompetitive one.
Several indicia are relevant to determining the existence of an
improper purpose. Generally, courts require the antitrust plaintiff
either to prove the existence of "specific acts, other than those in-
cidental to the normal use of the courts, directed at attaining the
18 Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 615 F.2d at 840-41; Gainesville v. Flor-
ida Power & Light Co., 488 F. Supp. 1258, 1265-66 (S.D. Fla. 1980) ("the requisite motive
for the sham exception is the intent to harm one's competitors not by the result of the
litigation but by the simple fact of the institution of litigation").
'" MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1156-58
(7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983); Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant,
664 F.2d 891, 896-97 (2d Cir. 1981); Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624
F.2d 1342, 1346-47, 1358 (5th Cir. 1980) (allegation that suit was filed to interfere with
plaintiff's mechanic's lien and to "strangle plaintiff's source of funds"), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1030 (1981).
I" See, e.g., Alexander v. National Farmers Org. 687 F.2d 1173, 1200-03 (8th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983), where the court found that the defendant's pattern of
litigation, although motivated in part by the desire to "break [the plaintiff's] back," was
nevertheless immune as directed against the plaintiff. Litigation and threats of litigation
against the plaintiff's customers, however, were not immune. See also First Am. Title Co. v.
South Dakota Land Title Assoc., 714 F.2d 1439, 1447-48 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 709 (1984); Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1980)
(competitor's antipathy does not eradicate first amendment protection).
387 See United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 360 F. Supp. 451, 451-52 (D. Minn. 1973),
aff'd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974); cf. WCCB-TV, Inc. v. Telerep., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 284, 286
(W.D.I.N.C. 1984) ("[a]nti-competitive intent alone does not make a petition to a court a
'sham' 
").
' See New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 110 n.15 (1978).
A good discussion of the "principal purpose" and "sole purpose" tests is contained in
Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1371-72 (5th Cir. 1983), which concludes
that a defendant should be protected so long as its desire for judicial relief "is a significant
motivating factor." See also MCI Communications Corp., 708 F.2d at 1155-56.
In Grip-Pak, Inc., 694 F.2d at 471-73, the court noted that the sham exception applies
where the antitrust defendant filed suit seeking "to hurt a competitor not by getting a judg-
ment against him, which would be a proper objective, but just by the maintenance of the
suit, regardless of its outcome." The court held that the exception could apply even where
there was a colorable claim and probable cause for the antitrust defendant's suit. Id. at 472-
73. But see Hydro-Tech Corp., 673 F.2d at 1177 nn. 7, 8.
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illegal objective, ' 189 or to make a showing of acts that are "abusive
of the judicial processes."' 90 Evidence of such acts includes the an-
titrust court's assessment that the defendant had no reasonable
basis for its previous litigation;' 9 ' the antitrust defendant's specific
acts of misconduct in the previous litigation, such as making mis-
representations to the court or failing to communicate settlement
offers;"9 2 and the antitrust defendant's admission that agency pro-
tests were filed automatically and without regard to merit.' 93 Lack
of success in the alleged sham litigation or administrative proceed-
ing may also constitute evidence of abuse,9 although it is not con-
clusive on the issue. 95 Success, on the other hand, is probably con-
clusive evidence that the antitrust defendant's conduct was not
abusive.19 '
The Supreme Court has not decided whether one suit or pro-
ceeding alone is sufficient to give rise to the sham exception, and
the Justices themselves appear to be divided.197 A majority of
"' Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342, 1358 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981).
190 Hydro-Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 673 F.2d 1171, 1177 (10th Cir. 1982) (filing a
lawsuit "without probable cause" and with an anticompetitive intent does not constitute a
sham). See also Semke v. Enid Automobile Dealers Assoc., 456 F.2d 1361, 1366-67 (10th Cir.
1972) (no sham was shown because defendants were not guilty of "fraud, corruption or mis-
use of state processes"); Mountain Grove Cemetery Assoc. v. Norwalk Vault Co. of
Bridgeport, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 951, 955 (D. Conn. 1977) ("some abuse or corruption of the
judicial process" is required).
"' Litton Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 809-12 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 984 (1984).
192 Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d 891, 896-97 (2d Cir. 1981).
193 Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mtn. Motor Tariff Bureau, 690 F.2d 1240, 1257 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
9 Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1257; see Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., v. Codding, 615 F.2d
830, 841 n.13 (9th Cir. 1980); Landmarks Holding Corp., 664 F.2d at 897.
195 Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagan Real Estate, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1124, 1133 (N.D.N.Y. 1977),
afi'd, 578 F.2d 1372 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978) (dismissal of three suits
instigated by defendants in opposition to zoning change did not give rise to sham excep-
tion). Cf. Subscription Television, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Theatre Owners Assoc., 576 F.2d
230, 232-33 (9th Cir. 1978) (Noerr-Pennington applied despite later determination that
anti-pay television legislation was unconstitutional).
1,6 Mid-Texas Communications Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372,
1383 (5th Cir. 1980); accord City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp.
1320, 1346 (N.D. Ind. 1979), modified, 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980); Baker Driveway Co. v.
Bankhead Enters., 478 F. Supp. 857, 860 (E.D. Mich. 1979); AREEDA & TURNER, supra note
68, T 203.1d (Supp. 1982). But see Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinios Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466,
471-73 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983). Success in obtaining an ex parte
temporary restraining order is not indicative of a lack of abuse. Id. at 473. See also Winter-
land Concessions Co. v. Trela, 735 F.2d 257, 263 n.4 (7th Cir. 1984).
197 In Vendo Co. v. Lekto-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977), the Court faced the issue
whether a federal court could issue an injunction against the execution of a state court judg-
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lower courts appear to hold that one vexatious or baseless action is
sufficient to state a cause of action, le8 while a minority hold to the
contrary. 199 Of course, a multiplicity of suits that are meritorious
does not give rise to a violation.20 °
Apart from baseless and repetitive claims, other conduct giving
rise to the sham exception includes fraud, misrepresentations and
perjury,2 01 bribery,' 2 conspiracy with a government official,2as
ment on antitrust grounds. The Court held that a federal court could not, based upon the
Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). Vendo Co., 433 U.S. at 630-43. In his concur-
ring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger, suggested that because only
one state court suit was involved, the state-court plaintiff could not be said to have used the
state court proceeding "as an anticompetitive device." Id. at 645. Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Brennan, White and Marshall, however, filed a dissent, taking the position that a
single abuse of the adjudicatory process could violate the antitrust laws. Id. at 661-62.
198 MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1154-55 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983); Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mtn. Motor Tariff Bu-
reau, 674 F.2d 1252, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Feminist
Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543 n.6 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 924 (1979); First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis,
482 F. Supp. 514, 519-21 (D. Minn. 1979), afl'd, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1042 (1981); Associated Radio Serv. v. Page Airways, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1088, 1094-
96 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Technicon Medical Information Sys. Corp. v. Green Bay Packaging,
Inc., 480 F. Supp. 124, 127-28 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Colorado Petroleum Marketers Assoc. v.
Southland Corp., 476 F. Supp. 373, 378 (D. Colo. 1979); Cyborg Systems, Inc. v. Manage-
ment Science America, Inc., 1978-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,927 (N.D. Ill. 1978). In City of
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 734 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1984), the court sug-
gested that, while one suit may be sufficient to give rise to the sham exception, the plain-
tiff's burden of proving baselessness is increased if only one suit is involved. Id. at 1162-63.
'" Mountain Grove Cemetery Association v. Norwald Vault Co. of Bridgeport, Inc., 428
F. Supp. 951, 955 (D. Conn. 1977); Huron Valley Hospital, Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F.
Supp. 1301, 1314 (E.D. Mich. 1979), vacated, 666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981); Central Bank of
Clayton v. Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163, 167 (E.D. Mo. 1976), afl'd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977) (all requiring multiple, repetitive suits). In Los Ange-
les Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. City of Oakland, 717 F.2d 470, 472-73 (9th Cir. 1983), the
court intimated that a single state court suit would not be sufficient to justify issuance of a
federal court injunction enjoining it. See also Razorback Ready Mix Concrete Co. v.
Weaver, 761 F.2d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 1985) (single lawsuit is insufficient absent allegations
that the lawsuit involves serious misconduct similar to the access-barring abuses described
in Trucking Unlimited).
200 Ad Visor, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 640 F.2d 1107, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 1981) (63
state court collection suits were not part of an anticompetitive scheme).
201 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512-13 (1972);
Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mtn. Motor Tariff Bureau, 690 F.2d 1240, 1259-63 (9th Cir. 1982)
("fraudulent furnishing of false information" regarding rates), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227
(1983); Federal Prescription Serv. Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Assoc., 663 F.2d 253, 263
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (misrepresentations in the adjudicatory process are not protected), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, 466 F.2d 272, 277-79 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1292-98
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources,
Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1359, 1385 (D. Hawaii 1978).
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threats and intimidation, rigged or phony bids,206 petitioning ac-
tivity that is part of a much broader anticompetitive scheme,10 6
and petitioning activity where the petitioner knew or should have
known that the government action sought would be "improper. 20 7
A few courts have also given attention to the "meaningful access"
20 Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 513; Federal Prescription Serv., Inc., 663 F.2d at
263; City of Atlanta v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 1982-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 7 64,527 at 72,924
(N.D. Ga. 1981). But see Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 803-05 (7th Cir.
1961). In Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 687 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976), the court held that commercial bribery, standing alone, does
not constitute an antitrust violation. No reference was made to the Noerr-Pennington cases.
203 Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1563-68 (5th Cir. 1984),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Gulf Coast Cable Television Co. v. Affiliated Capital Corp.,
53 U.S.L.W. 3543 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1984) (No. 84-951). Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape
Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 742-46 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); Duke &
Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3rd Cir. 1975); Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz.,
339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1964); Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Jefferson
City, 589 F. Supp. 85, 89-90 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Richard Hoffman Corp. v. Integrated Bldg.
Syst., 581 F. Supp. 367, 374 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Ashland-Warren, Inc., 1982-1 TRADE CAS.
(CCH) at 72,929. But see Alphin Aircraft, Inc. v. Henson, 1984-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) T
66,161, at 66,502 (D. Md. July 5, 1984); Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc.,
390 F. Supp. 696, 704-05 (D. Colo. 1975). Public officials do not become conspirators simply
because they have been persuaded to undertake the action urged by the defendant. Federal
Prescription Serv., Inc., 663 F.2d at 264-65; Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516
F.2d 220, 229-30 (7th Cir. 1975). See generally AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 68, 71 203.3a-
203.3c (Supp. 1982).
Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No.
150, 440 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971).
'00 United States v. Young Bros., Inc., 728 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming antitrust
conviction, but no petitioning immunity asserted), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 246 (1984);
Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist. of Peoria, 557 F.2d 580, 592-93 (7th Cir. 1977),
vacated on other grounds, 435 U.S. 992 (1978); F. Buddie Contracting, Inc. v. Seawright, 47
ANTITRUST & TRADR REG. REP. (BNA) 7 75,759 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 1984) (unreasonable
restraint of trade may occur where there has been tampering with competitive bidding pro-
cess). Bid rigging may also fall under the commercial exception. See supra notes 121-33.
206 Coastal States Mktg. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1371 n.42 (5th Cir. 1983); Clipper Exxp-
ress, 690 F.2d at 1263-65; Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 994 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Harco Prods., Inc., 512 F.2d 993,
1000-03 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 831 (1975); Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank of
Ariz., 339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1964). Indeed, any independently illegal conduct commit-
ted during the course of petitioning activity may subject the defendant to antitrust scrutiny.
See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 303-04 (1973), in which the Court held
that if the plaintiff, who alleged that the defendants had deprived him of his seat on a stock
exchange in violation of the antitrust laws, had lost his seat in violation of the exchange's
rules, "the antitrust action should very likely take its normal course."
207 Greenwood Utils. Comm'n v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484, 1499-1500 (5th Cir.
1985). The court expressly cautioned, however, that the petitioner should not be placed in
the position of having to predict the validity of the government action sought. Id. See also
Subscription Television, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Theatre Owners Assoc., 576 F.2d 230, 233 (9th
Cir. 1978).
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language of Trucking Unlimited.08 Although one court has said
that barring access "is the cornerstone to the sham exception,"20 9
others have held that barring access is not a prerequisite,210 and it
does not appear to have developed as conduct separate and apart
from other sham activity. One of the few courts to have actually
applied the sham exception under this language found that the de-
fendant's administrative tariff filings denied the plaintiffs "timely"
access to administrative consideration."
A final kind of petitioning activity lacking the usual immunity,
although not traditionally characterized as sham activity,1 2 in-
volves action which is routinely approved by the government
agency to which it is directed, such as in common carrier or public
utility rate-setting procedures. When the rate-setting agency does
little or no more than adopt the anticompetitive rates proposed by
a defendant, the defendant may be held liable for antitrust conse-
quences even though the agency's approval has the effect of requir-
ing the defendant to comply with the rates set.213 Liability in this
situation is based on the theory that the rates are really the prod-
uct of the person or persons being regulated rather than that of the
government agency.21 The cases do not establish how much partic-
I" Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 512.
209 Wilmorite, Inc. v. Egan Real Estate, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1124, 1134-35 (N.D.N.Y. 1977),
afl'd, 578 F.2d 1372 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978).
21O Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 809 n.36 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 984 (1984); Clipper Exxpress, 690 F.2d at 1257-59 (discussing several
cases on the subject); Federal Prescription Service, Inc., 663 F.2d at 263-65; Sage Int'l, Ltd.
v. Cadillac Gage Co., 507 F. Supp. 939, 947 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("[i]n the judicial setting,
access will not generally be denied, unless in a de facto way by presentation of perjury or
other misconduct before the court").
211 City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 982-83 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981).
"' See id. at 981 (the court observed that the sham exception "standing alone" did not
apply to a rate making proceeding).
21 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592-602 (1976); City of Kirkwood v. Union
Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1180-81 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); City of
Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1981); City of Mish-
awaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 981-83 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1096 (1981). Cf. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
707-08 (1962) (the Court rejected a Noerr-Pennington defense because of the defendant's
exercise of its discretionary powers as a purchasing agent of the Canadian government);
Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. British Airways Bd., 433 F. Supp. 1379, 1387-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
But see Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1721,
1730-31 (1985), where the court reversed a judgment against private rate setting bureaus on
the ground that their conduct was justified under the state action exemption.
"' In Cantor, the Court noted: "There is nothing unjust in a conclusion that respondent's
participation in the [state public service agency's] decision is sufficiently significant to re-
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ipation in the rate-setting process the agency must have before the
defendant may obtain Noerr-Pennington protection, but they do
suggest that the agency's role must be "dominant," or at least
"significant." 1 5
2. Foreign Implications
To date American courts have not had much opportunity to ap-
ply the sham exception rules to the "nonpolitical" branches of for-
eign governments. Although the Ninth Circuit had little difficulty
with the concept in Coastal States Marketing,21 6 courts should an-
ticipate several problems. One will be determining which foreign
government agencies or branches qualify as "political.121 7 Election
to office cannot be the criterion, because many foreign government
chief executives would fail to qualify. In nondemocratic govern-
ments, the level or importance of the government agency may thus
prove to be the only available criterion.
A second problem will involve deciding which law to apply in
determining whether a claim filed before the "nonpolitical" gov-
ernment entity is baseless. A claim not baseless under foreign law
may be procedurally baseless under United States law and may
have anticompetitive effects. Currently, under these circumstances
United States courts evidence a tendency to apply their own crite-
ria for baselessness.218 It would be appropriate, however, for courts
to give consideration to the foreign law policy and the defendant's
good faith in attempting to effectuate that policy.
quire that its conduct implementing the decision ... conform to applicable federal law."
428 U.S. at 594. In City of Mishawaka, Indiana v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978), the court held that "if an anticompetitive
practice is the product, at least in part, of the company being regulated . . . then the an-
ticompetitive condition is in reality the work of that company." Id. at 1320, quoting City of
Shakopee v. Northern States Power Co., Civ. No. 4-75-591, slip op. at 6 (D. Minn. 1976).
Alternatively, liability may be imposed on the theory that the defendant's filing of rates
does not constitute petitioning activity. See MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1155 n.114 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 234 (1983); Litton
Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 807-08 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
984 (1984); In re Wheat Rail Freight Rate Antitrust Litigation, 579 F. Supp. 517, 537-38
(N.D. Ill. 1984), afl'd, 759 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1985).
215 See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 594-95.
s See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
27 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
218 Cf. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Forbo-
Giubiasco S.A. v. Congoleum Corp., 516 F. Supp. 1210, 1217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (in denying
defendant's motion for summary judgment on act of state grounds, court held that it could
determine not the validity of a foreign patent but only "whether the foreign patents were
obtained through inequitable conduct").
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One may hypothesize, for example, a situation in which the law
of foreign country X permits A, the first entrant into a new market
in X, to bring suit under specified circumstances to bar or limit
subsequent entrants. The purpose of the law may be to encourage
A to enter the market by protecting him from competitors while he
develops the new market. One may further hypothesize that A
brings suit in X to limit the participation of B, a potential compet-
itor, in the market. In response, B sues A in the United States on
an antitrust theory, jurisdiction and the requisite effect on com-
merce being assumed. What defenses are available to A? Clearly
the defense of sovereign compulsion is not available, for A's action
in X is purely discretionary.2 19 Under the authority of Timberlane,
the act of state defense is likewise probably not available. 220 Inas-
much as the sole purpose of A's suit is to interfere with B's com-
petitive activity, for which there is no legal basis in the United
States, B would further argue that A's foreign law suit is a sham
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Because of the undisputed
foreign law basis for A's suit, however, A's suit should not be re-
garded as baseless, and A should be allowed to invoke the protec-
tion of Noerr-Pennington2 2
1
A third problem will be defining what constitutes a conspiracy
with a government official when the official involved not only has
policy-setting functions but also participates in operating a state-
owned enterprise.222 Under present domestic law a defendant may
be said to have conspired with a government official if the defen-
dant induces the official to act on the basis of his personal interest
in the outcome of the regulated matter.223 In a case in which the
" Continental Ore Co., 370 U.S. at 707 ("[tlhere is nothing to indicate that such law in
any way compelled discriminatory purchasing"); Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compul-
sion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 133-38 (Apr. 1967).
210 See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
' See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Assoc., 749 F.2d 1378,
1384 (9th Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3826 (U.S. May 7, 1985) (No. 84-
176), where, in applying the seven-part test for determining whether international comity
would permit the exercise of jursidiction, the court observed "a potential conflict with the
Honduran government's effort to foster a particular type of business climate." See also Con-
tinental Ore Co., 370 U.S. 690, 706 (1962) (as part of the justification for its decision, the
Court noted that "there is no indication that the Controller or any other official ... would
have approved of joint efforts to monopolize"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 403(2)(c), 403(2)(d), 403(2)(g) (Revised) (Tent. Draft
No. 2 1981) (limitations on jurisdiction to prescribe); § 491 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1983) (recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign judgments).
2I Cf. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 66, at 53-57; HAWK, supra note 3, at 113.
213 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 68, § 203.3c (Supp. 1982).
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official participates in a state-owned enterprise, however, his per-
sonal interests may be difficult to distinguish from his official re-
sponsibilities. Under these circumstances, if the defendant deals
with the official as a regulator, the defendant should be free to use
appropriate persuasion. The mere fact that the official's compensa-
tion from the state-owned enterprise increases as a result of his
regulatory decision in the defendant's favor should not give rise to
the conspiracy exception to Noerr-Pennington.
Finally, some commentators have recently suggested that the
''routine approval" exception extends to any situation in which the
defendant procures an order compelling it to perform anticompeti-
tive activity.22 4 Such an extension would be unwarranted. In prin-
ciple, an order compelling specific anticompetitive conduct is no
different from government acts that achieve the same result
through less obvious but equally effective means, such as legisla-
tion. A defendant procuring foreign compulsion, therefore, should
normally be protected not only by the act of state and foreign com-
pulsion defenses but by Noerr-Pennington as well.2 25
The courts have never addressed the question of whether the
sham exception rules would apply generally to acts of state so as to
bar an act of state defense. Presumably, the sham exception rules
224 ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 82, § 8.23 at 272-73, noting that the "fairness justifi-
cation" and "comity rationale" for the defense of government compulsion is diminished
under these circumstances. The authors do, however, observe the act of state doctrine may
still be brought into application. Id.
25 See Joelson, supra note 98, at 1128-29. Societe Internationale Pour Participationes
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208-09 (1958), appears to be
authority to the contrary. The Court there held that if a party actively "courts" legal imped-
iment to the production of relevant evidence, he will be subject to appropriate sanctions for
failure to produce the evidence, including dismissal or a default judgment. Id. The case,
however, appears to be limited in its application to discovery during the course of pending
litigation. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 114-19 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); United States v. Bank of N. S., 691 F.2d 1384, 1388-89 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 1119 (1983); General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 295-304
(S.D. Cal. 1981); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 226-33, 629 P.2d
231, 302-09 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981). Societe has not been applied to com-
pulsion in more substantive areas. The case may be further distinguished on the ground
that the act of state implications of the holding do not appear to have been argued to the
Court, and the case was decided prior to Noerr.
Relevant to Societe is In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d
992, 998-99 (10th Cir. 1977), in which the court suggested that a party's good faith, albeit
unsuccessful, attempt abroad to avoid the impact of foreign regulations restricting discovery
would relieve the party of sanctions for failure to comply with a discovery order. See also
United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 346-47 (7th Cir. 1983); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 420(2) (Revised)
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982).
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would not so apply. If genuine foreign policy concerns are present,
the nature of the defendant's conduct should not cause a court to
abandon the doctrine whose role it is to address those concerns.
There are, however, two situations in which courts have ruled
that the defendant's conduct has a bearing on the application of
the act of state doctrine. One is the corruption of government offi-
cials. As discussed earlier, the Hunt case left unresolved the ques-
tion whether the act of state doctrine applies when the defendant
has induced government action through bribery.2 6 Although the
Ninth Circuit in Clayco Petroleum subsequently held that the doc-
trine still applied,227 at least two other courts have held to the con-
trary.2 8 The other situation is, according to Sisal, that in which
the defendant has engaged not only in the petitioning of the for-
eign government, but also in other anticompetitive activity.22 9
Apart from these limited situations, sham-type activity should
have no bearing on application of the act of state doctrine. Thus,
when a defendant's Noerr-Pennington defense fails, the court
must still consider the act of state defense.
IV. CONCLUSION
Application of Noerr-Pennington to the petitioning of foreign
governments is in a developmental stage. Consequently, it is diffi-
cult to predict what effect Noerr-Pennington will have upon the
act of state doctrine and what their subsequent interrelationship
will be. One may nevertheless safely conclude that the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine will add significant depth to the defenses already
available to persons petitioning foreign governments. Hopefully,
this relatively new doctrine will contribute to the formulation of
clear and predictable rules applicable to contacts with foreign
governments.
, See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
"s 712 F.2d 404 (1983).
Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 690 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) ("even an unrepudiated act of state may be scrutinized by the courts if it resulted
from the corruption of government officials"); Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F.
Supp. 896, 909-10 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("corrupt activity by foreign sovereigns is beyond the
umbrella of the Act of State Doctrine"). The court in Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo,
S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983),
expressly declined to address the issue. See Recent Decision, International Law - Act of
State Doctrine: An Emerging Corruption Exception in Antitrust Cases?, 59 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 455, 467-69 (1984), which argues for a corruption exception to the act of state
doctrine.
... See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. See also HAWK, supra note 3, at 134-39.
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